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SOME QUERIES ABOUT
PRIVACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
Michael Grossberg*
DESPITE BIRTH AND residence in Tory-created English Ca-
nada, David Flaherty has become a latter-day Paul Revere. A
self-described privacy advocate and leader of the data protection
movement, Flaherty has traveled throughout Western Europe and
North America championing informational self-determination as a
necessary protection for human dignity and liberty in advanced
industrial societies. From forum to forum, he warns of an Orwel-
lian future of uncontrolled surveillance societies unless we protect
informational privacy.
One hundred years after Warren and Brandeis, Flaherty in-
sists that we rephrase the debate over informational privacy by
using constitutional protections to leap over the mazes created by
state, provincial, and federal laws in the United States and Ca-
nada. Constitutionally sanctioned informational self-determination
would be, he argues, the ultimate guarantor of privacy rights-the
trump to stop the growth of surveillance societies.1
Flaherty's argument is cogent and compelling. And there is
no doubt that informational privacy problems abound.2 There are
basic reasons for securing protection against public and private
data collectors and excessive concentrations of power in state and
commercial bureaucracies. We all feel a visceral revulsion against
intrusive monitoring of our lives. As a historian, I want to use my
comment to place his warning and his remedy in the context of
the debate over privacy that has raged since the late nineteenth
century. My intent is to probe some of the implications of Fla-
* Associate Professor of History and Law, Case Western Reserve University.
I. See Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protec-
tion, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 831 (1991).
2. Those interested in pursuing Flaherty's ideas should read D. FLAHERTY, PROTECT-
ING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES (1989).
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herty's plea for action by raising three related concerns about
turning to constitutional self-determination to protect informa-
tional privacy.
First, as in all privacy debates, persistent definitional
problems persist. Flaherty notes that privacy is an amorphous con-
cept and suggests that informational privacy is even more so be-
cause it is at the margins of privacy jurisprudence.3 He addresses
the issue principally by restating Alan Westin's general definition
of informational privacy as an individual's right to control data
disclosure.4 Yet to carry out the Paul Revere analogy, when Re-
vere yelled "The British are coming," the colonists knew what he
meant and grabbed their muskets; but when Flaherty tells us "Big
Brother is Coming," neither the enemy nor the required action is
clear. He defines informational privacy primarily through Cana-
dian case law examples involving search and seizure, blood tests,
and electronic surveillance. However, as a call to arms, we need a
proscriptive vision-a sense of the "ought" not just the "is." Spe-
cifically, the meaning of informational self-determination or the
German "private personality" concept must be made clear. Read-
ing Flaherty's essay, one wonders whether informational privacy is
an end or a means to an end, and just what a constitutional infor-
mational privacy right might protect.5
More detailed explanations are necessary for two reasons.
First, while almost everyone favors privacy in the abstract, conflict
always arises over the particulars. Like obscenity, most people
agree there is a line beyond which conduct is unacceptable: but
where is it? Who is to draw the line? How will it be drawn? Spec-
ificity is particularly important in understanding whether informa-
tional privacy is something that we have and must protect or is
something to be gained.
Second, it is impossible to escape these definitional issues be-
cause they have pervaded debates over privacy and information
3. See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 832-33.
4. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (defining privacy as "the claim
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others").
5. Even before the Warren and Brandeis article, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen recog-
nized these definitional problems by stating: "to define the province of privacy distinctly is
impossible." J.F. STEPHEN. LIBERTY. EQUALITY. FRATERNITY 160 (1873). This is because
individuals cannot escape the biases of their own times to achieve a precise and abstract
analysis. See Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 238 (1977); see
also D. LINOWS. PRIVACY IN AMERICA. Is YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE PUBLIC EYE?
(1989).
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since the nineteenth century." Privacy is in many ways a matter of
shared expectations and sensibilities; thus, controversy over its
meaning has always been linked to clashing normative concerns
about the flow of information and the social occasion, purpose,
timing, and status of those gathering and using information. In
1890, concern about informational privacy focused primarily on
the telegraph or census and mail (for example, the legitimacy of
census questions about religion or marital status) or individual
complaints about press publicity.7 Like others at the time, Warren
and Brandeis depicted the problem as single, isolated acts of dis-
closure of private facts.' Since the 1960s, the debate has shifted
dramatically to questions involving the long-term accumulation
and disclosure of vast amounts of intimate facts. Embedded in
these shifts are contested senses of "the self" that privacy ought to
protect.9 As commentators struggle to categorize the growing
number of privacy claims, they have spawned a host of classifica-
tions such as aesthetic and strategic privacy, procedural and sub-
stantive privacy, or territorial, informational, and decisional pri-
vacy.1" As Mary Dunlap has argued, "in the seemingly inevitable
fusion of the actual or descriptive personal with the normative
personal, the right to privacy before a given court and in a given
political era expands and contracts in significant part according to
the subjective perspectives of judges on human nature."'1 We
need Flaherty to give us a clearer sense of what informational
self-determination means today to understand how it might struc-
ture the legal future.
Definitional uncertainties about informational self-determina-
6. For historical overviews, see D. SEIPP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY, 1-27 (1978) (discussing privacy in the early nineteenth century), and Note, The
Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (1981)
(examining the extent to which American courts and legislatures recognized privacy as an
independent interest in the 1800s).
7. See D. SEIPP, supra note 6, at 30-54 (discussing measures taken to insure the
confidentiality of telegraphic messages and the opposition to the addition of questions to
the census).
8. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
9. For a compelling analysis of these issues, see Post, The Social Foundation of
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 958
(1989).
10. See Artz, Privacy Law in Massachusetts: Territorial, Informational and Deci-
sional Rights, 70 MASS. L. REv. 173, 176-99 (1985).
I1. Dunlap, Where the Person Ends, Does the Government Begin? An Explanation
of Present Controversies Concerning "The Right to Privacy" 12 LINCOLN L. REV. 47, 49
(1981).
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tion are amplified by a second major issue: Flaherty's tendency to
universalize informational privacy. That is, Flaherty treats it as a
transcendent reality and diminishes the temporal, cultural, and
class differences in its meaning. This tendency is evident in his
language. He talks of surveillance societies,12 correct constitu-
tional decisions,'3 more advanced privacy protection,' 4 and hostil-
ity to privacy interests. 5 None of these phrases are expressly de-
fined, but as always with a modernization vocabulary they assume
universal meanings. Yet treating privacy as a uniform human
value rather than a culture-bound and time-bound concept gener-
alizes both threat and response. It discounts how the boundaries of
informational privacy have changed over time and down-plays the
specific contests that produced those changes. Sociologist James
Rule reminds us that the "tendency to treat privacy as if it were a
coherent 'thing' with the same significance in one setting as in
another has often blurred important distinctions."' In this way,
universalizing informational privacy avoids debate on its central,
yet contested, issues as well as the need to explain what is at
stake.'
The role class has played .in conflicts over informational pri-
vacy is illustrative. A universal constitutional right to privacy self-
determination assumes equal protection for all, as in the German
law that seemingly gives every individual control over personal
data. 7 The past should make us wonder if such a goal can ever be
achieved. Equal privacy rights not only challenge the age-old
quest for information about the dependent to protect taxpayers'
pockets and about the deviant to enforce community standards,
these rights also defy the persistent class biases of privacy law
itself. The Warren and Brandeis article is said to have originated
in Warren's patrician concerns about the press invading his pri-
vacy."8 Flaherty acknowledges that "[e]ven privacy protectors
12. See Flaherty, supra note 1, at 835-37.
13. See id. at 840.
14. See id. at 854.
15. See id. at 835-36.
16. J. RULE, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY, PLANNING FOR PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS AS
POWERFUL TECHNOLOGIES 21 (1980). For a compelling argument about the time-bound
nature of words, see D. RODGERS. CANTESTER TRUTHS. KEYWORDS IN AMERICAN POLITICS
SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1987).
17. See D. FLAHERTY, supra note 2, at 86-90 (discussing the German Constitutional
Court's interpretation of the West German Constitution as creating a general right of
privacy).
18. For a full discussion of the class origins of the essay, see Barron, Warren and
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sometimes forget that all individuals, including such marginals as
prisoners, are entitled to advance privacy claims."'" I am not so
sanguine that the issue is "forgetting" rather than differential
treatment. In the inevitable balancing tests judges will use to
weigh constitutional claims, I wonder how the informational rights
of the lower classes will fare.
Several decades ago Berkeley law professor Jacobus tenBroek
wrote about a persistent dual system of family law that stretched
back to the Elizabethan poor laws.20 It promoted liberationalist
policies for the middle and upper classes and repressive ones for
the lower classes.21 Privacy is now part of that dual system, as is
evident in judicial rulings on the fourth amendment as a privacy
protector. In Wyman v. James,22 the Supreme Court upheld New
York welfare department regulations requiring Aid to Families
with Dependant Children claimants to consent to home visits in
order to maintain benefit eligibility. The Justices reasoned that
even if the visits could be characterized as "searches," the consent
of a recipient to be visited was a fair trade-off for the aid sought
from the state.23 In a contrasting use of the constitutional protec-
tion against search and seizure, the Court sustained en-
trepreneurial protests against warrantless Occupational Safety
and Health Administration searches.24
Such differing uses of the amendment illustrate how class has
been used to distinguish privacy rights. Welfare recipients cannot
avoid disclosing intimate information, no matter what havoc it
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark
Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 (1979).
19. D. Flaherty, On the Utility of Constitutional Rights to Privacy and Data Protec-
tion 43 (Nov. 16, 1990) (unpublished version of paper delivered at the Case Western Re-
serve Law Review Symposium: "The Right to Privacy One Hundred Years Later") (al-
though Professor Flaherty has deleted this language from his published paper, the issues it
raises continue to merit consideration).
20. See Handler, Editor's Introduction to J. TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE
POOR XV (J. Handler ed. 1964) ("The dual system took hold at the point when the public
took responsibility for the relief of the poor; its guiding principle has always been the pro-
tection of the public purse. The result has been to create, in tenBroek's terms, a wall of
separation between the poor and the rest of society with regard to family law.").
21. Id.
22. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
23. Id. at 309-10.
24. Marshall v. Bartow's, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347 (1977); see also Dunlap, supra note
11, at 57-63. Dunlap argues that the Supreme Court in Wyman and Marshall assumes
"material privacy can be earned, and that the 'undeserving poor,'. . . simply have failed to
earn the degree of privacy that is afforded to business persons by law." Id. at 57.
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wreaks on their lives. Equally important is the popular support for
such disclosures as protection against welfare fraud. The limits
imposed on the informational privacy of the economically poor are
echoed in privacy decisions such as those upholding Hyde Amend-
ment25 denials of publicly funded abortions to indigent women.2 6
Similar balances occur in statutory privacy. For example, the
Massachusetts Fair Information Practices Act 27 was intended to
give the poor and powerless access to needed government ser-
vices,28 yet other legislation gave welfare bureaucrats the author-
ity to order banks and employers to release information about
wages and deposits by applicants and recipients or spouses owing
support.29 The bureaucratic ability to police the lives of the depen-
dent has been greatly increased by computer matching, which al-
lows agencies to share data.30 Statutes and decisions like these
may well render privacy meaningless for most economically poor
people. As a Springfield, Massachusetts, woman struggling to
keep her benefits recently told political scientist Austin Sarat, "I
don't like coming here [to legal services] no more than I like going
there [to the welfare office]. No fun sitting, waiting, and telling
things to another stranger, but I'm at my end."31
Privacy rights have never been uniformly granted but have
varied according to age, sex, race, marital status, political beliefs,
religious practices, and residence. It is unclear how a universal
constitutional right to informational self-determination can over-
come this long tradition of differential treatment or if heterogene-
ity should be addressed through uniform or distinctive privacy
protections. Moreover, it is unclear what trade-offs Flaherty would
make to protect the integrity of a general constitutional right
when he admits in a footnote that as a privacy advocate he fears
resting abortion rights on privacy because they may be too much
for privacy to bear.3 2 As Catherine MacKinnon argues, "if ine-
quality is socially pervasive and enforced, equality will require in-
25. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).
26. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
27. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 66A, §§ 1-3 (1988).
28. See Artz, supra note 10, at 183.
29. See id. at 192 (discussing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 117, § 17 (1971), ch. 118, § 3A
(1982)).
30. See id. at 192 (discussing welfare and financial information sharing).
31. Sarat, ". .. The Law is All Over' Power, Resistance and the Legal Conscious-
ness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUM. 343, 360 (1990) (emphasis added).
32. Flaherty, supra note 1, at 839 n.37.
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tervention, not abdication, to be meaningful. But the right to pri-
vacy is not thought to require social change. It is not even thought
to require any social preconditions, other than nonintervention by
the public."33 By presenting informational self-determination in
universal terms, Flaherty challenges us to question whether we be-
lieve in privacy in civil libertarian terms: that everyone shares an
interest in freedom from unjust, intimidating surveillance and that
an attack on the privacy rights of the dependent and deviant poses
a threat to us all.34
A final issue in comprehending the utility of a constitutional
protection for informational self-determination comes with Fla-
herty's presentation of the sources of surveillance societies. The
primary cause appears to be technology, but Flaherty does not
fully discuss his causal argument.3 5 However, causal sources pro-
vide important mediums for evaluating Flaherty's conception of
the threat to privacy and his proposed solution. In that regard,
two sources suggested, but not fully explained in the essay, are
worth noting briefly.
First, the debate over informational privacy since Warren
and Brandeis's era can be read as a series of escalating struggles
over information itself. Part of the threat Flaherty warns us about
derives directly from the incessant demand for information that
has dominated organizational life in the United States and other
Western European nations since the nineteenth century.36 The
growing thirst for data at the time that Warren and Brandeis
wrote became evident in census changes: one schedule with four
questions in 1790, 233 schedules and a total of 13,161 questions in
1890.11 For those imbued with the new empirical mentality, to
count was to understand.38 Consequently, rising demands for in-
33. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989).
34. In this vein, Flaherty's argument for constitutionally sanctioned informational
privacy raises the thorny issue of rights as tactical weapons. Though he does not address it,
a lively debate is underway on the faith in rights that lies at the heart of his argument. See,
e.g., Minnow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987)
(posing an interpretive view of rights); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363
(1984) (surveying and critiquing rights as debated by American legal scholars).
35. See generally D. FLAHERTY, supra note 2 (individuals in Western societies are
subject to surveillance through the use of data bases).
36. See id. at I (Western industrial countries are already information societies and
are becoming surveillance societies).
37. C. WRIGHT, THE HISTORY AND GROWTH OF THE UNITED STATES CENSUS
(1900). See generally M. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS, A SOCIAL HISTORY (1988)
(describing the evolution of the United States Census and its relation to history).
38. See P. COHEN, A CALCULATING PEOPLE, THE SPREAD OF NUMERACY IN EARLY
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formation were not only products of new technologies but more
importantly were signs of a persistent organizational ethos that
created what Arthur Miller has called "data addicts."39 Public
and private organizations began gathering information in response
to their need for specialized data to monitor welfare cheats, credit
risks, felons on probation, and parents owing child support. Ac-
cording to the 1977 United States Privacy Protection Study Com-
mission, "The real danger is the gradual erosion of individual lib-
erties through the automation, integration, and interconnection of
many small, separate record-keeping systems, each of which alone
may seem innocuous, even benevolent, and wholly justifiable."O
Thus, a constitutional challenge to data collection would strike at
the heart of modern organizational society.
Flaherty raises a second causal issue by using comparative
analysis. His transnational comparison inevitably provokes ques-
tions about the cultural determinants of informational privacy in
an effort to understand to what extent it is culture-bound. 1 Ca-
nada and the United States are useful examples. Flaherty stresses
the similarities between the two by presenting parallel versions of
the same story.42 However, an extensive body of comparative anal-
ysis stresses the fundamental cultural differences between the
United States and Canada. It emphasizes clashing values about
the state, individualism, the virtues of adversarial solutions, and
the proper balance between individual and social needs.43 These
are evident in contrasting national slogans: "Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness" versus "Peace, Order, and Good Govern-
ment."'44 The differences have implications for informational pri-
AMERICA (1982) (discussing the causes that gave rise to the increases in popularity of
numbers and statistics in the 1800s).
39. A. MILLER. THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS. AND DOSSIERS
250 (1971).
40. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974: AN ASSESS-
MENT app. 4, at 108 (1977).
41. For a telling James Thurber comparative privacy anecdote about clashing French
and American notions of state information powers, see H. SPIRO, PRIVACY IN COMPARA-
TIVE PERSPECTIVE 121 (1971).
42. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note I, at 846.
43. See, e.g., S. LIPSET. CONTINENTAL DIVIDE: THE VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1990).
44. See generally M. GOLDBERG & J. MERCER. THE MYTH OF THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN CITY 12-31 (1986) (discussing values and attitudes that differentiate Americans from
Canadians); S. LIPSET, supra note 43 (comparing the values and culture of the United
States and Canada). Flaherty's use of comparison raises methodological issues as well, par-
ticularly the question of whether similarities or differences are the most analytically useful.
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vacy in each nation. One result of these differences is evident in
the contrast between the Canadian decision to create a Privacy
Commissioner and the American rejection of an administrative so-
lution in favor of allowing individuals to police data-keeping orga-
nizations. The American reluctance to create independent agen-
cies versus the Canadian tendency to do so and the tendency of
American procedures to preserve a more significant role for judi-
cial review replay earlier differences in approaches to juvenile jus-
tice and workers' compensation. 45
Focusing on comparison thus helps locate a second set of
causal issues involved in informational self-determination. It sug-
gests a need to appreciate that the phrase "informational self-de-
termination" may signify very different realities in different na-
tions.46 At a time when the reemergence of ethnic rivalries in
eastern Europe gives new meaning to the term Balkanization and
even Canada seems to be breaking apart, perhaps we should pay
more attention to the cultural determinants of informational
privacy.
In raising these issues, my intent has been to pose the ques-
tions I think are raised by Professor Flaherty's timely call for in-
formational self-determination. Recalling Paul Revere, perhaps
the way to achieve the informational self-determination Flaherty
seeks is not through procedural reforms or constitutional changes,
but to do what Revere did: help launch a revolution. It may be
that we need to challenge the collecting of information itself. As
Rule and his colleagues declared in 1980: "The alternative to end-
less erosion of personal privacy through increased surveillance is
for organizations to relax the discriminations which they seek to
make in their treatment of people." 47 To do so would entail risks:
For a compelling argument in favor of the importance of analyzing differences, see Sewall,
Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History, 6 HIsT. & THEORY 208 (1967).
45. See, e.g., Hagan & Leon, Rehabilitation of Law: A Social-Historical Compari-
son of Probation in Canada and the United States, 5 CAN. J. Soc. 235, 236 (1980) (ex-
ploring the similarities and differences in the juvenile and adult probation movements in
the United States and Canada); Leon, The Development of Canadian Juvenile Justice: A
Background for Reform, 15 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 71, 95-104 (1977) (discussing the history
of early twentieth century legislation regarding juvenile law in Canada); Risk, 'This Nui-
sance of Litigation. The Origins of Workers' Compensation in Ontario, in 2 ESSAYS IN
THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW 418 (D. Flaherty ed. 1983) (discussing the forces behind
the development and origin of workers' compensation laws and legislation in Ontario).
46. For a compelling example of such an argument, see Fineman, Contexts and
Comparisons, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1431 (1988) (critically reviewing Professor Glendon's
comparison of American and European approaches to abortion).
47. J. RULE, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 154 (1980). See generally K. GREENAWALT.
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risking an economy judged by standards other than efficiency (an-
other crusade led by Brandeis with his repeated calls for economic
decentralization); a welfare state in which support is not tied to
full disclosure of family life; and a market in which credit is less
dependent on to past behavior. It may be that we can achieve the
informational self-determination that Flaherty so fervently cham-
pions only by reducing our total reliance on personal information.
Through his compelling call for informational self-determina-
tion, Flaherty continues to guide the present debate over informa-
tional privacy. In the spirit of commemorating the Warren &
Brandeis article, I would like to conclude by emphasizing that the
debate over privacy of information has raged for a hundred years.
In 1890 not only did the privacy article appear in the Harvard
Law Review, the New York Sun also published "The New
Inquisition":
I am census inquisitor
I travel about from door to door.
From house to house, from store to store,
With pencil and paper and power galore.
I do as I like and ask what I please.
Down before me you must get on your knees:
So open your books, hand over your keys,
And tell me about your chronic disease.
Are you sure you don't like it? Well, I'm not to blame;
I do as I'm ordered. Wouldn't you do the same?
I'm a creature of law, and work in its name
To further the new statistical game.
I nose from garret to cellar,
With my last improved statistical smeller.
If the housewife objects I loftily tell her,
"I'm a socialistic government feller."'48
LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY 92 (1975) (evaluating current legal protections of infor-
mational privacy in a study prepared for the United States Office of Telecommunications
Policy).
48. D. SEIPP, supra note 6, at 27.
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